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ISBN 9780199248209. £75.00 
 
This volume is the culmination of several years’ engagement by one of today’s 
leading scholars with perhaps the foremost issue in criminal law: what makes 
someone responsible for a crime and therefore liable to punishment? Writ small, 
Lacey’s thesis is that responsibility serves to legitimate the criminal law and to 
facilitate its coordination of social behaviour. She argues that these two core 
functions pose different challenges and engender divergent responses in different 
times and places. In other words, responsibility has no metaphysical essence that 
can be captured; as a concept, it is rooted in historical and cultural specificities. By 
advancing these arguments, Lacey aims to provide a counternarrative to what she 
perceives to be the dominant voice in debates over criminal responsibility: that of 
legal and moral philosophers. The fact that fewer publications adopting this 
philosophical approach are cited than those adopting the interdisciplinary, 
historical approach Lacey advocates (10-11) throws some doubt on this 
perception, but it also testifies to the impact her work has had on the field. 
 In the first three substantive chapters of the book, Lacey chronicles the 
development of criminal responsibility within English law from the eighteenth 
century through to the present. She structures her narrative around four 
conceptions of responsibility – capacity, character, outcome and risk – taking 
account of the three forces she considers to have most powerfully shaped the 
patterns and practices of responsibility attribution: ideas, interests and 
institutions. She provides case studies to illustrate each of these influences, 
postulating connections between the composition of responsibility and shifts in 
prevailing political, economic and social conditions. Restricting her analysis in this 
way serves to contain what is a formidably ambitious undertaking. Her selection 
of ideas and interests also serves to narrow the focus. In the chapter dedicated to 
ideas, Lacey hones in on conceptions of the self and human nature, the growth of 
psychological and social sciences, the emergence of Utilitarianism, the 
relationship between the individual and the state and gender. With approximately 
a page dedicated to each theme, these developments are sketched with necessarily 
broad strokes. Similarly, the chapter on interests provides a brief overview of the 
economic, professional, political and cultural or symbolic powers that Lacey 
deems most salient.  
 In the various case studies, and in chapter five, Lacey maps out the 
trajectory of criminal responsibility from character, which forms a spectrum from 
treating conduct as evidence of character through to asking whether it expresses 
a settled disposition, to capacity, which prioritises a defendant’s choices and 
opportunities. The outcome and risk paradigms of responsibility are relatively 
modern, the former emerging in the nineteenth century with the regulatory state 
(and again with the mid-twentieth century welfare state) and the latter arising 
alongside the heightened sense of insecurity that is characteristic of the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century. As Lacey makes clear, these 
responsibility types often co-exist and overlap, forming distinctive 
conglomerations. For example, in Lacey’s view, English law currently favours a 
combination of character and risk responsibility, which has been used to target 
terrorist suspects, migrants and asylum seekers in response to a crisis of security. 
Detailing these historical changes is a significant contribution to 
knowledge (though they will be familiar to those already versed in Lacey’s former 
work), and the book’s explanatory aspirations distinguish it further still. Lacey is 
to be applauded for offering an explanation of these developments, and for 
confronting some of the methodological challenges this involves. She is quite open 
about the “speculative” (24) dimension to her interpretation but a little more 
clarity about the nature of the relationship she envisages between legal practices 
and their contextual environs would have been welcome. In her discussion of the 
criticisms leveled at interests-based historical explanations, Lacey recognises that 
these are “real difficulties” but suggests they have occasioned “significant over-
reaction” (81). One way to overcome these difficulties, she suggests, is to be alert 
to the way that interests are mediated by institutional structures and realised and 
rationalised in terms of ideas. This, she argues, can help avoid reductivism. 
However, she has less to say about how to overcome the kinds of “rather vague 
assertion[s] of the way in which ‘material forces’ are ‘reflected’ in the structures 
of allegedly superstructural phenomena” (81). Lacey’s own expressions of choice 
are “influenced” and “shaped by” but, without further elaboration, it is not clear 
whether, and if so how, these are any less problematic.  
In the penultimate chapter of the book, Lacey makes a convincing case for 
extending her multidisciplinary, historically-informed approach into the realm of 
special jurisprudence (the analysis of legal concepts) and general jurisprudence 
(the theorisation of law itself). In her view, it is essential for any jurisprudential 
project that purports to be in any sense a theory of law to appreciate the social 
existence of law as it really is. Theorists with normative ambitions must also, she 
argues, be concerned with the conditions in which the principles and values they 
espouse are likely to survive. All of this is very convincing but several questions 
remain to be answered. Just how much generality can this kind of analysis provide 
whilst remaining meaningful (a reasonable amount, Lacey ventures (190))? And 
what is the appropriate division of labour? To Lacey, “philosophy, history, law and 
the social sciences can be understood as making complementary contributions to 
the general project of social theory” (204). Accordingly, hers is not “historical 
scholarship, but…draws on historical research to drive its interpretive project” 
(12). But can reliance on secondary historical research really serve this kind of 
project well?  Might an historian, well-appraised of the jurisprudential and 
normative issues at stake, not uncover a significantly different story that alters the 
interpretive picture? Questions such as these merely underscore how rich and 
provocative this book is: it is essential reading for anyone with an interest in 
criminal law, legal theory, legal history and/or social theory. 
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